Introduction
Arguing for the importance of the concept of "security" across the discipline of geography, Chris Philo (2012, 2-3 , original emphasis) drew on the idea of "ontological security", with its evocation of "'the closest-in' human geography" of embodied experience, to make the case for the relevance of questions of security for geographers "wishing to remain close to what they take as the distinctively humanscale attributes of human geography". Geographical usage of the concept of "ontological security" most commonly cites Anthony Giddens ' (1990, 92) formulation:
The phrase refers to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action. A sense of the reliability of persons and things, so central to the notion of trust, is basic to feelings of ontological security; hence the two are psychologically closely related. 1 For Giddens, a sense of ontological security is a psychological achievement that enables most people, most of the time, to take for granted -to trust -that our ordinary, everyday worlds are reliable and dependable. To theorise this psychological achievement he drew on the developmental ideas of several psychoanalysts, including especially D.W. Winnicott (1971) and Erik Erikson (1950) as well as R.D. Laing (1959 Laing ( /1965 , who, as Chris Philo (2012, 3) has noted, coined the phrase "ontological security".
Giddens' account of ontological security has been taken up by geographers in two main areas. First, and most prominently, it has been used in studies of the psychosocial impacts of housing, where debate has focussed on whether, and if so how, 1 Part or all of this excerpt has been quoted by, for example, Colic-Peisker and Johnson (2010, 353) ; Halfacree (2006, 49) ; Hiscock et al. (2001, 50) ; Kearns et al. (2000) ; Skey (2010, 716) ; and Waite et al. (this issue) , with closely related quotations from other writings by Giddens used by Davidson (2000, 38 fn4) and Valentine (1998, 321) . Social and Cultural Geography (forthcoming) 3 housing confers a sense of security upon its occupants (see for example ColicPeisker and Johnson 2010; Dupuis and Thorns, 1998; Hiscock et al 2000; Kearns et al 2000) . These studies focus primarily on what people have to say about the meanings of their homes and do not seek to delve deeply into their subjective feelings of trust or security in their environments. Indeed, on occasion, Giddens' formulation is described as "overly psychological" (Dupuis and Thorns, 1998, 30) . In this literature, therefore, there has been little interest in the concept's psychoanalytic underpinnings.
The second area in which the concept has been taken up by geographers, albeit only occasionally, is in explorations of experiences of stress and distress (Davidson 2000; Valentine 1998; Waite, Valentine and Lewis, this issue) . A striking example of particular relevance to this paper is provided by Gill Valentine's (1998) deeply shocking autobiographical account of being subject to a very personal campaign of harassment. She traced the impact of anonymous phone calls and hate mail on her felt sense of the spaces in which she lived and worked at the time, writing of the sense of violation that came from being unable to "secure the boundaries" of her everyday spaces of home and work (Valentine 1998, 323) . She provided a vivid account of the shattering of her ordinary taken-for-granted trust in her "personal geography", which, before the harassment began, had been largely invisible to her.
Using Giddens' formulation, Valentine (1998) powerfully evoked what it is like to experience one's ontological security coming under extreme pressure because key features of everyday life have lost their reliability. The refugees and asylum-seekers quoted by Louise Waite, Gill Valentine and Hannah Lewis (this issue), together with the fictional asylum narrative explored by Patricia Noxolo (this issue), also give voice to lives lived in extremely stressful conditions, in which the external world cannot be relied upon. As these and other texts make clear, refugees and asylum seekers suffer multiple losses of security: having fled circumstances felt to be extremely injurious if not life-threatening, they may find that the supposed safety of countries of asylum exposes them to, and traps them within, very precarious circumstances, including forced labour and potentially demeaning forms of impoverishment. Social and Cultural Geography (forthcoming) 4
The testimony of those living in such precarious conditions evokes in readers a sense of what it might be like to lose taken-for-granted, external sources of security.
At the same time, the accounts presented by Waite et al (this issue) resound with a sense of outrage at exploitation, oppression and prejudice. These refugees and asylum-seekers know that they deserve better and the same is true of Valentine's (1998) account. I would argue therefore that, despite significant ruptures in the "constancy of the[ir] surrounding social and material environments", Waite et al's interviewees, along with Valentine, seem to have retained at least a degree of "confidence […] in their self-identity" (Giddens 1990, 92) . This suggests that, in the terms of Giddens (1990) formulation, although under intense pressure, their ontological security has survived, affording some protection to their sense of selfworth and their faith in the possibility of a beneficent environment even as external reality repeatedly lets them down.
In this paper I seek to complement these accounts of ontological security under intense pressure by evoking and exploring ordinary and unexceptional feelings of insecurity that might reasonably be termed ontological, experienced in conditions of material security and privilege. These are not responses to extreme, external pressures like those of the person suddenly subject to stalking, or to members of a family fleeing persecution and then trapped in poverty, or indeed those carrying diagnoses of mental illness. Instead, I contend that these ordinary experiences of insecurity are an ordinary part of ordinary everyday lives, which most of us feel at least some of the time but which are typically quite fleeting and which may go barely noticed let alone acknowledged. My aims in exploring these ordinary feelings of insecurity are twofold. First, I seek to retrieve, foreground and bring to life the psychoanalytic thinking that was integral to both Laing's and Giddens' accounts of ontological (in)security. In so doing I hope to make a richer version of the concept available, one that acknowledges a dynamic interplay between feelings of security and insecurity, which, I suggest, together typically imbue our sense of who and how we are in the world. Secondly, my intention is to convey these ideas through the performative evocation of feelings as well as through conceptual argument. More specifically, by evoking ordinary experiences of feeling insecure, I aim to illuminate an understanding of ontological security and ontological insecurity as a continuum along which we all necessarily move, sometimes with great speed, rather than as a Social and Cultural Geography (forthcoming) 5 binary distinction that locates and fixes each of us within one of two discrete categories.
To achieve these aims in the next section I offer a brief discussion of my methodological decision to draw on my own experience via autobiographical vignettes to elaborate my argument. I then turn to Laing's original account of ontological security and insecurity, drawing out two key points about his formulation.
Following this I present and discuss three short autobiographical vignettes that narrate moments drawn from a period in the second half of 2011 when I was working on -or at least towards -the preparation of an academic paper for publication. In this discussion I draw on several contributions to what evolved into the British object relations tradition of psychoanalysis (for an overview, see Gomez 1997) on which Laing (1959 Laing ( /1965 and Giddens (1990 Giddens ( , 1991 
Exploring (my) feelings
This paper has its origins in an invitation to speak at a conference to the title "insecure selves/feeling insecurities". Such an invitation might be understood as a call to take up a position of expertise in relation to others who are or who feel In a psychoanalytic register, the centrality of the unconscious means that what any of us might say about ourselves is always a cover story that dissembles, perhaps seeking to conceal other, potentially more significant, truths (Callard 2003; Phillips 1995 is the idea that the first person singular voice on which I rely is a construct or something I perform, the frayed edges of which I wish to evoke. In this I implicitly echo Judith Butler (2005) , who, drawing on Adriana Cavarero (2000) , has argued that to give an account of oneself is impossible without the intimate involvement of others. The tradition of object relations psychoanalysis, which informs the account I offer here, understands personhood as inherently relational, constructed through our unconscious need for and interactions with others, especially but not only our primary caregivers.
Writing is itself a relational process that depends on actual or imagined readers to produce me as author. In seeking to evoke the feelings of which I write, I am explicitly inviting readers to identify with elements of my account. This process of identification refers to the experience of recognising in someone else aspects of oneself and one's own experience. Recognising oneself in the other can be deeply problematic, particularly if it rests upon, or leads to, an assumption that the other's experience is just like one's own, or vice versa. This risks effacing or colonising the other's experience, denying their difference and thereby necessarily mis-recognsing them 5 .
Although processes of identification carry these risks, especially if enacted easily and without any sense of dissonance, when tentative and partial, they also hold open the possibility of forms of recognition that neither deny nor expunge difference, and which support a sense of shared humanity 6 . In the context of the pitfalls and become integral to the training and practice of counsellors and psychotherapists (Bolton 2004; Wright and Bolton 2012) . 5 This effacement of the other is sometimes also attributed to empathy (for example Watson 2009 ). Elsewhere (Bondi 2003) I have argued that empathy draws on identification but differs from it in that it also entails a sustained awareness that the other's experience is not the same as one's own. Identification tends to be less "thought" and less effortful, whereas empathy involves much work and is accompanied by a constant sense of fallibility (also see Bondi, in press). I would argue that compassion, for which Waite et al. (this issue) advocate, is closely related to this understanding of empathy.
6 My use of the first person plural in this paper is intended as a gesture towards this sense of shared humanity. 
Laing on ontological (in)security
In Laing's (1959 Laing's ( /1965 Secondly, in the extract I have quoted, Laing might be read as setting up a binary distinction between persons who are ontologically secure and those who are not.
However, he also suggested more of a gradation of experience when he described ontologically insecure people as having a "low threshold of security" (Laing 1959 (Laing /1965 . In illustrating forms of anxiety associated with ontological insecurity, the first example Laing used was of a young man who displayed in his behaviour and speech clear symptoms of psychotic illness. But Laing (1959 /1965 explicitly countered suggestions that the patient in question could reasonably be described as "insane", thereby calling into question any binary opposition between sanity and madness. More generally, Laing's work in such ventures as the development of the Kingsley Hall therapeutic community explicitly suspended demarcations between normal and abnormal, sane and crazy (Miller 2004; McGeachan 2010) . Perhaps some of the troubled and chaotic features that accompanied his own creative brilliance can similarly be understood to call into question the idea that some of us are sane, well and normal, while others are not, that some of us are ontologically secure while others are not. In the autobiographical vignettes and discussion that follow, I follow Laing in rejecting correspondence between insanity and ontological insecurity.
Giving Up (August 2011)
On 10 Exploring the phenomenon of not being able to dream, Thomas Ogden (2003, 19, emphasis in original) drew on Bion's (1962) account that dreaming "creates consciousness and unconsciousness and maintains the difference between the two".
On this account the blurring of wakefulness and sleep suggests an erosion of the capacity for unconscious psychological work. This is most acutely manifest in "the psychotic's inability to discriminate conscious and unconscious experience" (Ogden, 2003, 20) . Social and Cultural Geography (forthcoming)
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I was able to write of this time only in retrospect. I recall feeling barely able to think and equally unable to take in the words, care or kindnesses of others.
I hope that you recognise in this narration echoes of Laing's account of the deadness and unreality characteristic of ontological insecurity. In Laing's (1959/65, 42) words, I
felt "more insubstantial than substantial, and unable to assume that the stuff 
Anxiety (September 2011)

In early September, I somehow find the energy to assemble my conference presentation. I have booked my ticket for a four-hour inter-city train journey. First I have to travel into Edinburgh on a local commuter service that normally takes about 20 minutes.
12 Darian Leader (2009) 
train rolls in to the city centre station I know so well, and I see across to the train I was meant to be on just as it begins its lumbering acceleration away from another platform. Seconds later, I step off my local train and walk like a cool, composed and blasé traveller across the station forecourt to find out when the next train to my intended destination leaves.
14 13 As Sara Ahmed (2004, 64) has noted "The difference between fear and anxiety is most often represented in terms of the status of the object": whereas fear refers to an object, anxiety is typically understood as a sense of threat that lacks a specific object or focus. ". This usage is traceable to Freud (1920 Freud ( /1955 and I follow it here, invoking anxiety as a way of experiencing oneself existentially and fear as more focused, for example on the imagined bodily consequences of anxiety. Drawing out the spatio-temporality of fear and anxiety, Ahmed (2004, 66 , emphasis in the original)
argues that "Anxiety becomes an approach to objects rather than, as with fear, being produced by the object's approach.
14 Not only did I miss the train but I also stranded a colleague with whom I was to be presenting our co-authored paper, and who I had arranged to meet on the train that I missed. We had not exchanged mobile phone numbers and so I could not let her know what had happened while we were both en route. Furthermore, my colleague had only very recently taken up a research post on the project from which our paper confidence in the coherence and continuity of our bodily form and in our capacity to "live out into the world" (Laing 1959 (Laing /1965 . 15 I allude to Torsten Hägerstrand's (1982) time-space geography. Navigating paths across time-space is necessarily embodied and highly variable. For example, some of us might require assistance to get on and off trains and others might take for granted the capacity to run to make a tight connection. 16 For many people, travelling is intrinsically anxiety-provoking. For a recent discussion that also makes use of psychoanalytic ideas, see Kingsbury, Crooks, Snyder, Johnston and Adams (2012) . 17 For a phenomenological account of embodied geographies of anxiety, see Davidson (2003) . Like depression, and often in conjunction with depression, anxiety is subject to medicalisation, the associated diagnostic categories typically organised around the apparent source of anxiety (as in specific phobias) or the accompanying behavioural responses (such as agoraphobic avoidance) together with a large "bucket" category of "generalised anxiety disorder". assistance of anyone else. There is nothing inevitable about this: had I remained in the grip of acute anxiety for longer, fellow passengers and station staff might have been confronted by a visibly distressed passenger, needing some kind of assistance.
Among the many factors that no doubt helped me to calm myself was that I knew that I could buy another ticket: economic security rendered my world less scary than it might otherwise have been, helped me to contain or regulate-down my experience of acute anxiety and contributed to my taken-for-granted capacity to travel.
Chronic, rather than acute, anxiety is central to Laing's (1959 Laing's ( /1965 her to be all that I am, but nor do I wish to live without the capacity to fully inhabit the outward-facing competence she makes available to me 19 . Ordinary, acute anxiety, I
would suggest, serves to remind us all that our capacity to approximate to Laing's (1959 Laing's ( /1965 or Giddens' (1990) account of a sense of being ontologically secure is paradoxically fragile. Put another way these descriptions of ontological security present intrinsically unattainable ideal types. They depend upon a sense of clear and stable boundaries that differentiate our selves from the worlds we inhabit. I have argued that any such clarity and stability is a normative fiction belied by ordinary experiences of anxiety 20 . 19 Understanding the subject as fragmented and decentred has been commonplace in geography for many years. While such theorisations have been helpful in unsettling "normative fictions" of the unified rational subject, postmodern accounts of the subject underplay what I have described here in terms of my capacity to gather myself together and maintain coherence and continuity without also denying my vulnerability to feelings of fragmentation and dissolution. On the debate between psychoanalytic and postmodern accounts of the subject see Layton (1998) . There is an absurdity in trying to convey in written words the experience of not being able to write. I may want to communicate a feeling of never-ending wordlessness but my words necessarily cover over rather than convey this experience 22 . And what I describe as not writing was, paradoxically, accompanied by the paper getting written.
Words and Wordlessness (October 2011)
Getting home from the conference I turn to the paper I have promised for the journal special issue. I struggle to write. I may be feeling better than I did in August but
If writing is understood as an unconscious as well as a conscious process, and if, as Freud (1901 Freud ( /2002 said long ago, "the unconscious is timeless", in my unconscious life there is no difference between a moment and eternity. When I was writing maybe I was feeling the timelessness of unconscious processing even as I consciously struggled to find, delete, replace and re-order words and sentences.
My description of despair and desolation again echoes Laing's account of the consequences of ontological insecurity, which render the world of the sufferer profoundly hostile and threatening. But in my recovery from such feelings, the elation I have described is surely just as unrealistic, resounding with a sense of omnipotence as intense and overblown as the preceding helpless impotence. This polarity is also evident in my account of realising that I might miss my inter-city train: I felt myself succumbing to -at the mercy of -ever-intensifying manifestations of anxiety, and I fantasised that by sheer force of will I could make the train I was on go faster. My oscillation between these extremes was unthinking and unreflective: I seemed to "flip" from one to the other, unaware of the contradiction between them, almost as if I inhabited two contrasting worlds simultaneously. These seemingly disproportionate, 21 The paper has since been published: Bondi (2013) . 22 The intrinsic unrepresentability of everyday lives and everyday geographies is a driving force for the work of non-representational theory (Anderson and Harrison (1946/1991) argued that splitting is developmentally enabling, allowing the kind of trust necessary for the realisation of something akin to Laing's ontological security in a world that is intrinsically unpredictable and hazardous. In other words, in order to trust and to experience ontological security, we actually need to buffer ourselves against the potentially overwhelming existential anxiety of living in an unpredictable and potentially brutal world in which the raw reality is that we, or those on whom we depend, may die suddenly and unexpectedly. For Klein (1935 Klein ( /1991 ), as we become more able to comprehend the world around us and to grasp our place in relation to others, we also become more able to bear uncertainty and accommodate mixed feelings . On this account, the persistence of unconscious functioning dominated by splitting beyond normative developmental needs expresses a deeply precarious sense of being in the world broadly consistent with Laingian ontological insecurity.
2010; Thrift 2007).
Klein, however, insists that we never wholly relinquish our capacity for splitting, and continue to use it routinely to manage our conscious and unconscious hurts and 23 My training and practice as a counsellor also provide ample evidence to that effect, and have contributed to a positive appreciation of my own vulnerability rather than construing these feelings as something to be ashamed of. 24 Unconscious splitting of the ego takes on particular importance in Freud's (1917 Freud's ( /2005 essay "Mourning and melancholia" and is central to W.R.D. Fairbairn's (1952) ideas about endopsychic structure as well as to Melanie Klein's (1975) concept of the "paranoid-schizoid" position, which I draw upon in this paper. 
Towards an emotional geography of ordinary insecurity
In Klein's (1946 Klein's ( /1991 In these accounts it tends to be other people whose thoughts and actions are shaped by these unconscious processes, and who, in turn, influence political discourse and organisational cultures. These analyses are compelling, and yet my response to them often worries me. What disturbs me is the ease with which I find myself disidentifying with and thereby locating myself outside the processes they describe. This happens when I think "I'm not like that" or "surely I wouldn't get caught up in that" in response to the potentially racist exclusionary impulses described by Sibley (1995) or the exuberant, unrealistic over-optimism described by Stein (2011) . When I catch myself responding like this, it seems to me that I am claiming immunity from the dynamics described in these accounts. Paradoxically, in so doing I surely replicate them: by saying to myself "I'm not like that" or "I wouldn't get caught up in that" I deny my vulnerability to the projective processes at stake. In this context, I want to pursue the theme of splitting a little further, elaborating what might be thought of as a personal emotional geography of splitting shaped by the location of blame. In so doing I draw attention to the difference between certainty and ontological security. To this end I return briefly to the first two autobiographical vignettes presented above.
Under the heading "Giving Up (August 2011)" I describe myself as suffering melancholic exhaustion, depletion and demoralisation. By differentiating this experience from an earlier, happier, period in a management role, I gesture to the possibility that the job had "done me in" and therefore that I was the victim of my This might be read as resonating with the location of blame externally rather than internally. But, as I argue above, for Laing, the dynamic interplay between inside and outside is such that ontological insecurity is necessarily a property of both.
Consequently "the dangers most dreaded can themselves be encompassed to forestall their actual occurrence. Thus to forgo one's autonomy becomes a means of secretly safeguarding it; to play possum, to feign death, becomes a means of preserving one's aliveness" (Laing 1959 (Laing /1965 . On this account, locating blame internally, and assuming an internal -and perhaps overweening -sense of responsibility for everything that goes wrong, may be as expressive of ontological insecurity as locating blame in a hostile world beyond me. As I have shown, this kind of psychic certainty is closely related to feelings of insecurity, which in turn are recognisable in Laing's (1959 Laing's ( /1965 ) description of ontological insecurity. For Laing (ibid., 39) ontological insecurity interferes with our capacity to feel "real, alive, whole and continuous". Moreover, the production of certainty through splitting insulates us from direct contact with the dilemmas and challenges of negotiating our external realities with others: it shields us from the messiness of a genuinely intersubjective world, and therefore, in Laing's (ibid., 39) words, leaves us unable to "live out into the world and meet others".
These dynamics offer a psychoanalytic lens through which to understand attempts to make certain, categorise and separate "us" from "them", illuminated, for example, in studies of attitudes to immigration, asylum and national identity (see for example Skey 2010; Waite et al, this issue) . But they are equally relevant in relation to my own insistence that "I am not like that" when I read about those who I judge to be stigmatising others. Certainty about who "we" and "they" are, almost invariably implies that "we" suffer or are wronged because of "them", and that "we" omnipotently insist on "our" entitlement or rectitude. Superficially such certainty might sound like an expression of (too much) ontological security, but my argument is that it is underlain by brittle and fragile foundations in which splitting serves as a defence Social and Cultural Geography (forthcoming) 25 against existential and unconscious anxieties. Uses of the concept of ontological security that lose connection with these underlying psychodynamics risk confusing it with comforting certainties. Conversely, attending to these dynamics, whether via fictional texts (Noxolo, this issue) or interview data (Waite et al., this issue) may be a pre-requisite for an attitude of compassion towards others.
The psychoanalytic underpinnings of the concept of ontological (in)security reveal richer and more complex ideas than geographers have generally acknowledged.
Laing's concern with the phenomenological interface between interior and exterior worlds suggests the possibilities of a geographical reading of these ideas. I have offered a personal account of feelings of insecurity, interwoven with a psychoanalytic account, to suggest that elements of ontological insecurity are an ordinary part of all our lives, rendering fragile our sense of being in the world. I have used my own experience in the hope that others will recognise in my autobiographical vignettes aspects of their own vulnerability to ordinary feelings of insecurity. In seeking to evoke or show, as much as to tell or explain, how psychoanalytic ideas can be used to think about personal and subjective emotional geographies, I have cautioned against confusing certainty with ontological security and I have sought to resist the temptation -sometimes very subtle -of locating feelings of insecurity in others as a way of disowning them in ourselves.
